18th EU Space Conference: The Ball on EU Preference Is in Member States’ Court
Ilona Zabrytska
A strong agreement emerges from the 18th European Space Conference: space has secured budgets, and now it is time to deliver.
Billions will (likely) be injected into the space industry, coming from the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework, the ESA Ministerial Council 2025, and national budget announcements (including Bundeswehr €35 billion commitment). While many countries have set 2029 as a red line to close key capacity gaps, the pitfalls identified by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta’s Reports are looming on the horizon: division on priorities, lack of interoperability of future systems, duplication of capabilities, and most alarmingly the absence of a clear agreement among the EU27 on a European space preference.
The effort now needed in capitals is to broaden the perspective from purely national to European, and from tactically short-term choices to long-term strategic decisions. The lessons learned have shown how European vulnerabilities and divisions can be exploited, and EU countries must build the freedom to use assets the way they decide. This would mean procuring space capabilities and services that European industry is able to develop, deliver, operate and improve in a non-dependent manner and – given the scale of funding required – creating jobs and security for European citizens.
Despite the open discussions on the EU preference, the latest is not enshrined in the proposed EU Space Act nor in the European Competitiveness Fund (which contains the future components of the EU Space Programme, under the “Space” window), but even if the European Institutions will be able to secure it for EU-owned assets, the last word is in Member States’ courts, considering the amount of national budgets spent to procure launchers and future constellations.
The priorities on the table are many, and the sense of urgency is shared among all stakeholders, at least in their discourses. To serve future needs, Europe will need capabilities such as Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) monitoring, independent Space Surveillance and Tracking capabilities including a pathway to integrate commercial providers, and the development of a strong “security-defence backbone” including connectivity through IRIS², navigation through Positioning Navigation and Timing Capacities (PNT) in low earth orbit, and high/revisit high resolution earth observation service for governmental services (EOGS), of as well as emerging topics such as space-based early warning missile-defence and in space operations and services (ISOS). This clearly requires a ramp-up, the integration of commercial players’ capacities, and a broad transformation: speed to deliver and space-defence integration. Complementarity and synergies will be crucial for this, and ESA and the European Commission are at the forefront of this commitment, with the role of federating Member States’ efforts through an incremental approach on existing and future capabilities.
Moreover, as the Commission has stepped in with the proposed “Space Shield” Flagship, there is a new opportunity to capitalise on the defence components of the EU Space Programme, and federate the future national capabilities, while also developing a coherent R&D roadmap for the future. Defence instruments, such as the new financial instrument supporting loans (Security Action for Europe, SAFE) and possibly the European Defence Project of Common Interests framework (EDPCIs), can be used for common procurement of space assets and services.
Nevertheless, institutions must keep in mind that when industry asks for EU preference, it is not asking for a favour, but to be treated as other spacefaring nations treat their national industrial players. Only “made in Europe” contracts and predictability will create true European sovereignty and build a strong European industry.
Ilona Zabrytska joined Eurospace as Policy Officer in 2025, where she is dedicated to reinforcing cooperation between European institutions and the space industry. She focuses on building relations with key stakeholders in Brussels, particularly with the European Parliament.




Brilliant breakdown of the institutional gap between EU ambition and member state execution. The tension between EU-wide coordination and national procurement is basically the story of every major defense decision in Brussels. I've sen this play out in defense tech circles where everyone nods about European sovereignty then immediately turns around and picks the cheapest bidder regardless of origin.