The Uncertain Artemis Program

Can space cooperation endure the geopolitical fractures on Earth?

Since J.D. Vance’s controversial speech at the EU during the Munich Security Conference in January, U.S. relations with its Western allies have been turbulent. The Trump-Vance-Musk administration has clashed with the EU, Ukraine, the UK, Germany, Denmark, France, and—repeatedly—Greenland. The U.S. is engaged in a trade war with Canada and French champagne (!), and tensions over Greenland’s sovereignty have sparked concerns of a possible invasion. Diplomatic friction reached new heights with a high-profile Signal chat scandal.

Amidst this turmoil, a critical question arises: Can space cooperation endure the geopolitical fractures on Earth?

The Allies’ Perspective: Canada and the EU

What happens if rising tensions spill over into the Artemis Program? Dr. Josef Aschbacher , Director General of the European Space Agency - ESA (ESA), maintains a steady stance:

“We have a very deep cooperation with the United States. It's a very long-standing agreement, which has produced several decades of extremely fruitful and constructive cooperation for both sides. We have not received any notification that this will not be required, so we are delivering, we are preparing our elements of this cooperation as planned, and this is certainly what I would like to reinforce.”

Canada appears similarly committed. Dr. Jessica West, Senior Researcher at Project Ploughshares, a Canadian peace and security research institute, noted:

“From a Canadian perspective—speaking from outside of both government and industry—the Moon is a major area of investment. Canada's contribution to the Artemis Program, particularly through the development of Canadarm3 but also our astronaut program and commercial initiatives, links together the Artemis Accords, the Lunar Gateway, and a long-term human presence on the Moon. Losing that investment would be a significant setback.”

However, an official statement from the Canadian Space Agency | Agence spatiale canadienne was less definitive:

“We’re working with the global community to peacefully and sustainably develop and explore space for the benefit of humanity.”

This ambiguous wording leaves room for interpretation—whether Canada remains fully committed, is cautiously observing, or might withdraw under certain circumstances remains to be seen.

Denmark, another Artemis Accords signatory and ESA member, has also been a target of U.S. diplomatic hostility. Unlike Canada, Denmark is not a major spacefaring nation, limiting its influence over the program’s direction. However, should ESA’s leading contributors—Germany and France—enter direct conflict with the U.S., will the Agency’s stance shift?

The U.S. Perspective: Where Is Artemis Headed?

If Europe remains on course and Canada is on alert but noncommittal, the real question is: What will the U.S. do with Artemis?

Historically, U.S. Space policy oscillates between two competing priorities: fast geopolitical dominance (Apollo) and slowly-built scientific exploration (ISS, Shuttle Program). Currently, Artemis is shifting from a science-driven initiative to a fast-tracked, geopolitically motivated mission.

Dr. Namrata Goswami, Professor of Space Security at The Johns Hopkins University, argues that this has long been an issue with Artemis:

“The ambitions of Artemis are not catered to the 21st century push for the economic development of the Moon. Rather they are focused on exploration and science missions, which are enablers for space programs but cannot be the sole goal.”

Originally conceived during a period of relative peace, Artemis was designed to establish a long-term lunar presence, following the ISS model of international collaboration. Some of its major elements—Orion, the Exploration Ground System, the Human Landing System (HLS), the Gateway—were built through multilateral agreements with commercial and international partners. The aim was a gradual, science-driven expansion toward Mars.

However, intensifying competition with China—whose International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), developed with Russia, is on track for a Moon landing by 2030—has dramatically altered U.S. priorities. Artemis has become a geopolitical race, a contest to land before China.

This urgency was evident in a February 2025 Hearing of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, titled Step by Step: The Artemis Program and NASA’s Path to Human Exploration of the Moon, Mars, and Beyond. Dr. Scott Pace, Director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington University, was a witness at the hearing and provided the following statement in response to a question for the record:

“If the United States believes landing an American on the Moon before China is a national priority, and if current HLS contractors are unlikely to succeed by then, then NASA could (in theory) commission a simpler government-led lander.”

Such a move would disrupt existing HLS contracts and could deprioritize international and commercial partnerships. Dr. Pace also raised concerns about the Gateway station, a key international collaboration involving, besides NASA, ESA, JAXA, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), and the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre (MBRSC).

“The lunar Gateway is an important means of continuing cooperation among the ISS partners. However, the Gateway is not immediately needed to landing on the Moon by 2030. Thus the program schedule could be slipped to the right to accomodate NASA budget limits. Such delay would be a hardship on the international partners who are paying for a large portion of the Gateway.”

While Artemis II and III are unlikely to change, significant alterations may come from Artemis IV, which might mark a turning point where U.S. priorities override cooperative frameworks. International allies could find themselves sidelined as the U.S. focuses on a nationalist space agenda reminiscent of the Apollo era.

Artemis Accords: Cooperation in an Uncooperative World

Can international agreements withstand these geopolitical shifts? Mike Gold, Chief Growth Officer at Redwire Space and a key figure in the Artemis Accords (the regulatory framework supporting the Artemis Program), remains optimistic:

“I think the current geopolitical situation demonstrates that we need the Artemis Accords now more than ever. Let’s do better in space than we have on Earth.”

When asked whether the Accords are losing influence, he countered:

“Quite the opposite. I have heard from several countries that are interested in signing the Artemis Accords. The American commercial sector continues to make great progress. All of this, plus continued game-changing progress by launch companies such as Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, and SpaceX, make the U.S. the most attractive partner in the world for international partnerships.”

Dr. Goswami also sees continuity but acknowledges potential shifts:

“The Artemis Accords themselves are unlikely to change. But if the US starts prioritizing Mars over the Moon, then this itself will affect the Lunar partnerships NASA has bilaterally built with other nations in terms of the Artemis Accords and Program. That will shift the current dynamics and most importantly funding priorities.”

For now, the Space bubble remains largely unaffected, but cracks are forming. The Gateway’s future is uncertain, contracts may be restructured, and international partnerships could weaken. While pragmatism may prevail—driven by substantial investments and the U.S.’s role as the primary gateway to the Moon—history suggests that Space is not a sanctuary from geopolitics. The swift unraveling of U.S.-Russia relations post-Ukraine invasion and the deterioration of EU-China cooperation amid rising U.S.-China tensions demonstrate that Earthly conflicts inevitably seep into space. How long before fractures on Earth start reshaping the Moon?